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Abstract 
 
This paper reports an effort to explore the issues of civil society legitimacy and 
accountability and the range of initiatives that have been created to respond to them.  The 
paper begins with a discussion of the factors that have made legitimacy and 
accountability critical issues, including some factors inherent in the nature of civil society 
and others that have emerged in recent years.  Then it develops a framework for 
understanding legitimacy and accountability as concepts, some elements that support or 
undermine their existence, and some possibilities for intervening to strengthen them.  The 
next section focuses on steps involved in building organizational accountability systems 
that respond to the multiple and potentially conflicting claims of organizational 
stakeholders.  The section illustrates these steps with examples from around the world 
and argues that such systems can contribute to strategic learning and organizational 
capacity-building as well as to enhancing legitimacy.  The following section provides a 
similar analysis for multi-organization domains—sectors, campaigns, and intersectoral 
problem domains.  It provides examples of innovative approaches to enhancing domain 
legitimacy and accountability from around the world and argues that such systems can 
foster productive discourses about the definition of domain problems and problem-
solving processes.  The closing sections discuss societal legitimacy and accountability 
and continuing dilemmas.  The paper concludes with an argument for the pivotal 
importance of improving civil society legitimacy and accountability given their growing 
roles in local, national and global governance and problem solving. 
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Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability: 
Issues and Challenges1
 
L. David Brown and  Jagadananda 
  Hauser Center    CIVICUS  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last twenty years, the roles of civil society organizations--community-based 
organizations, churches, development NGOs, relief agencies, advocacy coalitions--have 
grown explosively.  While there are many differences across regions and countries, 
researchers still suggest that the trends amount to a “global associational revolution” that 
has major implications for governance and social problem-solving.2 A recent UN report 
suggests that “civil society is as much a part of today’s global governance as 
governments,” and many see central roles for civil society organizations (CSOs) in 
coping with the critical challenges that confront our increasingly interdependent world.3
 
To fulfill this promise, however, CSOs must themselves grapple with clarifying their 
legitimacy as social and political actors and their accountabilities to key stakeholders that 
ensure that they contribute to the public good.  Dealing with these issues will help CSOs 
define more clearly their missions and values and position them to learn more effectively 
from their experience.  Better answers to questions about legitimacy and accountability 
can help mobilize staffs, allies, and public support.  While CSOs have often been 
remarkably effective at holding governments and corporations accountable to policies 
and promises, their continued effectiveness will turn on their capacity to live up to their 
own standards.4  Therefore there are both internal and external reasons for attention to 
these issues.   
 
This paper teases apart some of the complexities of civil society legitimacy and 
accountability and describes examples of the growing array of systems and practices for 
responding to legitimacy and accountability challenges.  It offers a framework for 
understanding the concepts of legitimacy and accountability, and then suggests 
approaches to enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of civil society organizations 
and multi-organization domains.  While it provides examples of efforts to grapple with 
these issues, the paper is not intended to provide detailed “how-to” advice for dealing 
with specific legitimacy and accountability challenges.  Such advice is available, 
however, at many of the websites and organizations described in the paper. 
 
The next section looks at issues of civil society legitimacy and accountability and 
suggests why they have become so important.  The third section provides a framework 
for understanding these issues and ways to address them.  It describes our definitions of 
legitimacy and accountability, their interaction in the context of civil society missions 
and strategies, and several sources of standards of legitimacy and accountability. The 
fourth section describes ways to build organizational accountability systems that can 
enhance the legitimacy and accountability of civil society actors.  Such systems can be 
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used to catalyze organizational learning and capacity building as well as to increase 
accountability and legitimacy.  The fifth section focuses on building the legitimacy and 
accountability of multi-organization domains.  Such domains include campaign alliances, 
sectors of similar organizations, and problem domains that involve diverse actors.  The 
sixth section briefly discusses the evolution of societal standards of legitimacy and 
accountability.  The seventh section describes some ongoing dilemmas that we expect 
will challenge and energize future debates.  The last section provides a brief conclusion.  
 
Overall, this report aims to contribute to local, national and global discourses and debates 
about civil society legitimacy and accountability.  We also hope it will help catalyze 
action at many levels to resolve questions posed by these debates.    
 
 
2. Why Legitimacy and Accountability? 
 
Why are legitimacy and accountability issues problematic for civil society organizations? 
In part the issues are inherent in the nature of civil society and in part they are a result of 
special circumstances that have emerged in the last twenty-five years.   
 
The nature of civil society as a sector contributes to questions about legitimacy and 
accountability in several ways.  For example, CSOs often mobilize people and resources 
through commitments to social values and missions that enhance the public good. Their 
reputation as legitimate and accountable stewards of those missions is vital to their ability 
to recruit staff and allies to their causes.  Gandhi and the Indian Independence Movement, 
Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement, and Solidarity and the Polish 
Liberation Movement all depended on their legitimacy as embodiments of widely held 
social values to mobilize support and credibility.  If CSOs leave questions about their 
legitimacy and accountability unanswered, they risk undermining organizational 
identities and capacities that depend on values and voluntary commitments.   
 
A second common attribute of CSOs is that they have diverse stakeholders that make 
competing accountability claims.  Unlike a corporation that is ultimately accountable to 
owners and shareholders or a democratic government that is accountable to voters, CSOs 
are not primarily accountable to any clearly defined stakeholders. Civil society 
organizations, in contrast, are accountable to many stakeholders: to donors for their 
resources, to clients for delivery of goods and services, to allies for performance of joint 
activities, to staff and members for meeting their expectations, and to government 
agencies for complying with regulations.  They are also accountable to their missions.  
Dealing with diverse accountability claims may be extremely difficult, and where 
stakeholders have different or contradictory interests, being fully accountable to all of 
them is impossible.  So accountability is a challenging problem for CSOs because of the 
nature of the sector and its relations to stakeholders.5
 
A third attribute of many CSOs is their predilection for taking up issues on behalf of poor 
and marginalized groups.  While this bias can be the basis for raising funds and support 
from charitable donations, it may also require challenging powerful constituencies whose 
interests may be harmed by proposed changes.  Those constituencies may see such 
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challenges as irresponsible or unwise at best: Gandhi, King and Solidarity all took on 
powerful actors who regarded their initiatives as illegitimate if not outright subversive.   
 
Issues of civil society legitimacy and accountability have emerged as particularly 
important in the last five years due to several factors.  First, many questions about civil 
society reflect concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of many institutions.  
Concerns about corruption in government agencies and unacceptable practices by 
business organizations are often as urgent as concerns about civil society.6  Illegal 
activities at Enron in the US or Bofors in India raise questions about both business and 
government accountability.  The impacts of such events can spread throughout societies, 
affecting public perceptions of many institutions.  In part the growing concern about 
legitimacy and accountability reflects a general “crisis of governance.” 
 
Second, some legitimacy and accountability questions grow out of problematic behavior 
on the part of some civil society organizations.  Publicity about the accusations of board 
self-dealing at The Nature Conservancy or the mistaken analysis made by Greenpeace of 
the proposed Brent Spar oilrig disposal in the North Sea raise questions about whether 
CSOs live up to their professed values and whether mechanisms exist to enforce 
minimum standards of practice.  CSOs, like many other organizations, are not uniformly 
altruistic nor are their actions always consistent with their values.7 Some challenges to 
their legitimacy grow out of their own mistakes or malfeasance. 
 
Third, some current challenges to CSO legitimacy and accountability come from agencies 
that have been targets of civil society advocacy activities.  When CSOs exert political and 
social pressure on behalf of marginalized constituencies, for example, they may inspire 
counterattacks by powerful interests.  Government agencies charged with corruption, 
corporations pressed to change bad business practices, and intergovernmental institutions 
challenged to alter projects or policies have often questioned the legitimacy and the 
accountability of their challengers.8  Of course, it is important that CSOs explain their 
legitimacy and their accountability to key stakeholders, but sometimes those criticisms 
are inspired by motives other than an altruistic desire for transparency.   
 
All these demands on CSOs have been further complicated by their expanding roles in 
the sphere of social development and change.  Civil society actors in the past have often 
been seen as “gap fillers,” providing services not available from the market or the state. 
However, in recent years they have increasingly taken on capacity building and policy 
advocacy roles that make them participants in multi-sectoral governance processes.9 
While much civil society work has historically been focused on local problems, CSOs 
now increasingly work at national and transnational levels as well.10  Their emerging 
roles in large-scale initiatives require new attention to the issues of legitimacy and 
accountability. 
 
 
3. Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability: A Framework 
 
We focus here on the concepts of legitimacy and accountability and their implications for 
enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of civil society actors.  Then we will explore 
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the interactions between legitimacy and accountability.  Legitimacy and accountability 
are concepts that can be applied at many levels: individuals, groups, organizations, 
interorganizational domains, societies, and so on.  Our focus here is on legitimacy and 
accountability for organizations and domains—the arenas most immediately available for 
influence by civil society actors themselves. 
 
3.1 Legitimacy 
 
The concept of legitimacy refers to perceptions by key stakeholders that the existence, 
activities and impacts of CSOs are justifiable and appropriate in terms of central social 
values and institutions.  For example, Edwards has defined legitimacy as “the right to be 
and do something in society—a sense that an organization is lawful, admissible, and 
justified in its chosen course of action.”11  Legitimacy is grounded in the perceptions of 
stakeholders in the larger environment in which the organization is embedded.  The 
concept has been most developed in thinking about political systems, but it has also been 
a matter of recent concern for development institutions and civil society actors.12
At least four kinds of legitimacy are important for CSOs.13  These forms of legitimacy 
are largely the product of external forces and dynamics that are not under the direct 
control of CSOs.  They include:   
• Legal Legitimacy: Legitimacy can grow from compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements, such as meeting state registration requirements or 
following national laws and codes that define appropriate CSO activity.   CSOs 
that have been certified by the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, for 
example, have gained legal status that enables their donors to deduct contributions 
from their taxes.  This form of legitimacy draws on the authorizing power of the 
state and its legislation. 
• Normative Legitimacy: Claims to CSO legitimacy can also be grounded in widely 
held social values, norms and standards.  CSOs with normative legitimacy are 
assessed as meeting norms for performance (“it does good work”), as 
implementing desired structures and processes (“it represents its constituents”), 
for fitting the task (“CSOs are good for grassroots organizing”), or for the 
characteristics of its leaders and staff (“its leaders are committed and effective”).   
Normative legitimacy is particularly important for CSOs since they are often 
value-based organizations that emphasize contributions to the public good at the 
heart of their missions. 
• Pragmatic Legitimacy: The legitimacy of CSOs may also emerge from the 
instrumental value they provide to various stakeholders, either directly in terms of 
specific outputs or more generally in terms of creating conditions that meet 
stakeholder interests.  Service or advocacy organizations may provide immediate 
benefits to stakeholders and so be perceived as legitimate; they may also 
contribute to creating more general contexts (better public health; more 
responsive government agencies) that are favorable to stakeholders and so gain 
their support. 
• Cognitive Legitimacy. CSOs are also perceived as legitimate when their activities 
and goals are widely seen as appropriate, proper, and “making sense” to the larger 
society.  Cognitive legitimacy may emerge from acceptance of organizational 
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activities as fitting into a comprehensible and acceptable story about their roles in 
society.  It may also emerge from widespread perceptions that the organization is 
a social institution that is “taken for granted” by the society as being part of “the 
way things are.”  This is true, for example, for churches and some educational 
institutions in many societies.   
 
Institutional legitimacy is derived from the perceptions of external observers and 
stakeholders. These perceptions are often the product of complex interactions and forces 
that are beyond the control of CSOs.  But we can identify at least four approaches that 
offer CSOs opportunities to enhance their legitimacy.14  The first three focus on aligning 
the CSO with existing legitimacy contexts and the CSO; the last emphasizes creating new 
stories and definitions of legitimacy when existing contexts are changing or responding to 
innovation. 
 
• Conform to existing models of legitimate organizations.  CSOs can adopt 
structures, procedures and systems that make the agency resemble other 
organizations that are widely perceived as legitimate. Adopting governance 
arrangements used by other agencies in the field, for example, can confer 
legitimacy.  This approach draws on existing legal, normative and cognitive bases 
of legitimacy to enhance external perceptions of the organization.  
• Inform external stakeholders in legitimated terms. CSOs can describe their 
activities in terms that draw on existing legitimacy standards and expectations.  
This approach may utilize pragmatic legitimacy by emphasizing the agency’s 
contributions to particular stakeholders, or it may frame the CSO’s story to 
emphasize widely held legal, normative or cognitive expectations.  
• Manipulate myths, symbols and ceremonies to build cognitive legitimacy. CSOs 
can use existing cognitive expectations to shape stakeholder perceptions of their 
legitimacy.  Adopting monitoring and evaluation schemes approved by donors, 
for example, may enhance CSO legitimacy with those donors even if the CSO 
does not use them for active learning or capacity building.  
• Construct new definitions and standards of legitimacy.  Aligning CSO activities 
with existing standards can support the very status quo the CSO seeks to change.  
It may be necessary to challenge existing laws, norms, cognitions, and interests to 
construct legitimacy consistent with a desired social transformation. CSOs can 
reframe existing definitions to demonstrate their negative consequences and use 
their experience to articulate new understanding of legitimate goals.  The 
women’s movement, for example, redefined the nature of “human rights” to 
include private violence against women as well as state abuses, a reframing that 
implies a positive state duty to intervene to protect women even in the private 
spaces of their households.  
 
These strategies move from pure alignment with existing expectations to actively 
changing the expectations that underpin legitimacy judgments.  While aligning the CSO 
with existing standards of legitimacy is easier than constructing new standards, for some 
CSOs creating new standards lies at the heart of their development task.  We will return 
to the issues of constructing new standards later in this report. 
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3.2 Accountability 
 
The concept of accountability has been defined in many ways, not all of them compatible 
or mutually reinforcing.15 We will focus on accountability as a responsibility to answer 
for particular performance expectations to specific stakeholders.16  So, unlike the general 
contextual expectations that shape the legitimacy of CSOs, accountability may focus on 
quite specific claims—from financial accounting practices, to quality of services 
delivered, to advocacy campaign tactics utilized.  CSO values, missions and strategies 
define goals and activities for which they might be held accountable by these 
stakeholders.   
 
For CSOs it is often difficult to identify stakeholders who have primacy in their 
accountability claims.  In other sectors primary stakeholders are often well-established: 
private sector firms owe primary accountability to owners and stockholders, and public 
agencies in democracies are accountable to voters and their elected representatives.  
CSOs, in contrast, are often accountable to many stakeholders, and therefore not 
primarily accountable to any.17 CSOs may owe accountability upward to donors who 
provide resources and to regulators responsible for their legal certification, downward to 
beneficiaries and clients who use their services or to members who expect representation, 
outward to allies and peers who cooperate in programs and projects, and inward to staff 
and volunteers who invest their talents and time in organizational activities.   
 
But it is not obvious which of these claimants has priority when their demands are not 
compatible.  Without accountability to donors, funding sources may dry up; without 
accountability to regulators, charters may be revoked; without accountability to 
beneficiaries, services may not be used; without accountability to staff and volunteers, 
operational capacity may be eroded; without accountability to members and political 
constituents, credibility may be undermined.  It is common for conflicts among 
accountability claims to be resolved in favor of stakeholders with the power to punish the 
CSO for lack of attention: Donors and regulators, for example, often get more 
accountability attention than beneficiaries or staff.  But that resolution of conflicting 
claims does not always advance CSO missions, particularly when they seek to foster self-
reliance, improved services, capacity-building, or political voice for marginalized 
populations.  How tradeoffs are made among stakeholders with conflicting claims is a 
critical issue to which we will return later.   
 
It is also critical to understand the nature of accountability relationships.  Several quite 
different models of accountability relations have emerged from work in different 
sectors.18   
 
• In government circles, for example, a commonly used model is representative 
accountability, which emphasizes the obligations of representatives to their 
constituents.  This model has roots in political theory and is often applied to 
public sector actors expected to be democratically accountable to voters or their 
elected representatives.  It is particularly relevant to CSOs that represent members 
or constituents to give political voice to otherwise unheard interests.  The civil 
society campaign against the Narmada dams in India, for example, claimed to 
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represent thousands of small farmers who would be displaced, and drew much of 
its legitimacy with stakeholders like the World Bank from its ability to speak 
credibly for those grassroots constituents. In representative accountability, 
violations of constituent mandates can lead to replacement of elected leadership.   
 
• In the business world the most widely used model is principal-agent 
accountability, which focuses on motivating agents to achieve the goals of their 
principals.  From this perspective, the major challenge is to design incentives that 
will keep the agent faithful to the principal’s interests.  Principal-agent 
accountability emphasizes the fiduciary responsibilities of agents and economic 
and legal incentives to encourage agents to act for principals.  Violations of 
contract accountabilities can be enforced through the legal system with financial 
or legal sanctions.  Donors often fund CSOs as agents to carry out tasks that the 
donors cannot accomplish by themselves, and donors often set standards of 
financial and program accountability to be met by their agents.  
 
• A third model that is particularly relevant to CSOs focuses on creating mutual 
accountability compacts that bind members through shared values, aspirations and 
social identities.  The parties to mutual accountability define shared goals and 
“buy in” to responsibility for achieving them.  Sanctions for violating 
expectations are social and relational, so relationships and trust become critical 
elements in the construction and implementation of shared analyses and plans.  
Mutually accountable relationships require developing shared understanding, 
respect, trust, and mutual influence.  They may require more time and energy to 
create and they are more difficult to maintain across large numbers of actors than 
agency contracts or representative mandates.  But many CSOs that build alliances 
across levels and regions to gain leverage find mutual accountability appropriate 
for dealing with the uncertainties they face. 
 
CSOs use different models of accountability with different stakeholders.  Relations with 
donors often depend on principal-agent negotiations and contracts; relations with 
members may be organized around representative accountability of elected leaders; and 
relations with allies may depend on mutual accountability grounded in histories of mutual 
trust and cooperation.  Relations constructed as one model may evolve over time into 
another, as when a long-term relationship between a donor and a CSO evolves from a 
principal-agent contract for specific outcomes to a more mutually accountable compact to 
accomplish shared social objectives.  When parties understand their relationship in terms 
of different underlying models, serious problems can arise.  Many Northern and Southern 
CSOs, for example, use the language of mutual accountability in constructing 
“partnerships,” and when Northern CSOs—sometimes under pressure from their own 
donors—invoke principal-agent concepts to administer the partnership, their Southern 
colleagues feel misled or betrayed.19   
 
Since accountability relations involve specific relationships and expectations, they are 
more subject to direct influence by CSOs than legitimacy perceptions.  After an elaborate 
analysis of accountabilities for intergovernmental organizations, multinational 
corporations, and transnational civil society associations, the Global Accountabilities 
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Project identified four core accountability mechanisms that are critical to managing 
accountability claims.20  These mechanisms are starting points for accountability 
management strategies with both internal and external stakeholders. 
 
• Transparency mechanisms enable the free flow of information between 
organizations and stakeholders in decision making, performance and reporting.  
Reporting and disclosure systems and processes that enable information sharing 
among parties are central to an effective accountability relationship.  Examples 
include audited accounts and annual reports made available to stakeholders. 
• Participation mechanisms enable internal and external stakeholders to be involved 
in organizational decision making.  Key stakeholder involvement in deciding 
about goals and activities may be critical to eventual accountability for their 
performance.  Participation mechanisms include regular consultations with 
stakeholders or inclusion of stakeholder representatives on Boards of Directors. 
• Evaluation mechanisms make it possible for stakeholders as well as the CSO to 
assess activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts.  Monitoring and assessing results 
enables judgments about the success of organizational efforts in meeting its 
performance premises.  Examples include organizational monitoring and 
evaluation systems, independent program evaluations, and social audits. 
• Complaints and redress mechanisms provide vehicles for raising questions about 
CSO performance and for sanctioning failures to deliver on performance goals. 
• These mechanisms are particularly important when large inequalities in power 
between the CSO and key stakeholders might undermine the capacities of 
stakeholders to demand accountability.  Review panels, juries and ombudsmen are 
examples of ways to create opportunities for complaints and redress by many 
stakeholders.   
 
Efforts to manage accountabilities to CSO stakeholders can focus on one or several of 
these mechanisms. The forms the mechanisms take vary across accountability models, 
since the underlying relationship characteristics are quite different.  Table 1 summarizes 
the models of accountability relationships and their differing requirements for core 
accountability mechanisms.   
 
For representative accountability, for example, voters need mechanisms that enable 
transparency and evaluation of representative performance, such as publication of votes 
or a free press that investigates and publicizes representative activities.  Voter 
participation in setting priorities and shaping decisions require regular interaction with 
representatives.  Complaints and redress issues can be raised by media or oversight 
agencies that influence voter actions in elections.   
 
For principal-agent accountability, principals must negotiate contracts that specify 
performance expectations, reporting arrangements, and rewards and punishments for 
various outcomes.  Contract provisions can be written to build transparency on critical 
issues and systems for evaluating performance, and the parties can rely on third parties, 
such as courts, to help enforce those contracts.  
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For mutual accountability, the parties must develop shared goals and perspectives and 
relationships of mutual respect and trust that can underpin their compact.  Such compacts 
depend on two-way sharing of information and participation in key decisions and on 
evaluation systems focused on agreed responsibilities for achieving shared goals.  
Complaints and redress turn on peer relations and participants’ commitment to 
maintaining their social identities and reputations.   
 
 Table 1. Accountability Relationships and Management Issues 
 
 Representative 
Accountability 
 
Principal/Agent 
Accountability 
Mutual Accountability 
Status of 
Parties 
Constituents elect 
representative to act on 
their behalf 
 
Principals hire agents to 
act on their behalf 
Parties engage each 
other to achieve shared 
goals  
Transparency Representative reports 
to constituents on 
mandated goals and 
activities 
 
Agent reports to 
principal on contracted 
goals and activities 
Parties report to each 
other on compact-related 
goals and activities 
Participation Voters work with 
representative to 
articulate mandates and 
define priorities 
 
Principal negotiates 
contract with agent to  
define goals and 
incentives 
Parties influence each 
other to define shared 
values, goals and 
compacts 
Evaluation Voters, press, and 
oversight agencies 
assess representative 
performance  
 
Principal and agent 
assess how each has 
lived up to contract  
Parties and peers assess 
performances defined by 
compact agreement 
Complaints/ 
Redress 
Elections, media 
coverage, and oversight 
mechanisms enforce 
mandates with electoral 
sanctions  
Courts adjudicate 
contract violations and 
enforce legal and 
economic sanctions  
Peer networks enforce 
expectations with 
identity and reputation 
sanctions  
 
3.3 Legitimacy, Accountability and Sources of Standards 
 
Legitimacy and accountability influence each other.  CSO legitimacy reflects generalized 
perceptions of the organization by actors in its environment.  Those perceptions may be 
influenced by management strategies that align organizational goals and activities to fit 
environmental expectations or (with more difficulty) reconstruct environmental 
expectations to fit the organization.  Accountabilities describe more focused expectations 
that are held by specific CSO stakeholders.  Improving accountability to appropriate 
stakeholders can strengthen CSO legitimacy by clarifying the interests they serve and 
how abuses can be controlled.  Questions about the legitimacy of CSOs are often raised 
in accountability terms:  “Who elected them?”  “Who holds them accountable?” 
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Defining the accountabilities of CSOs and how they are enforced is probably the single 
most powerful intervention for preserving and enhancing their legitimacy as social actors.  
But how are such standards and enforcement processes defined?  And to what extent can 
CSOs influence the substance of accountability standards and the processes by which 
they will be enforced?  We believe that there are three sources of accountability standards 
that are important for civil society:  (1) established societal ideals reflected in laws or 
widely held norms and expectations; (2) negotiated domain standards created by 
communities of organizations to govern a common area of work; and (3) strategic 
organizational choices about standards and stakeholders that govern the activities of 
particular CSOs.   
 
Established societal ideals are standards for accountability rooted in legal traditions, 
social norms or cognitive expectations.  CSOs are expected to obey basic laws and norms 
of their societies, and governments may create specific regulations for their formation, 
resources, and activities.  Social norms and “customs having the force of law” also create 
societal ideals. When very high salaries for chief executives of some charitable 
organizations in the US became public knowledge, many donors reduced their 
contributions because the organizations had violated widely-held norms about reasonable 
compensation in the nonprofit sector.  Some national governments have sought more 
rigorous state regulation of civil society organizations in response to perceived abuses, 
though such regulation may also create significant costs in undermining the sector 
flexibility and ease of entry that generates social energy and innovation.   
 
Sometimes civil society and government agencies cooperate to jointly develop societal 
standards.  Box 1 describes the evolution of the Philippines Council for NGO 
Certification (PCNC) as an effort to negotiate and enforce standards for the NGO sector 
in cooperation with government agencies, so that the resulting standards are responsive to 
the concerns of both sectors.   
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Box 1.  Societal Standards: The Philippine Council for NGO Certification  
 
The Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) emerged as the product of a 
negotiation between the Department of Finance and networks of civil society organizations in 
the Philippines.  In the mid-90’s the Department proposed to abolish tax deductions for 
contributions to NGOs because lack of oversight was leading to rampant abuse and corruption 
as well as reduced government revenues.  Some NGOs, on the other hand, believed that the 
change would affect the resources contributed by business and wealthy individuals quite 
negatively. 
 
Six networks of Philippine NGOs agreed to develop a code of conduct and to carry out peer 
reviews to certify NGOs as being in compliance with the code.  The Government agreed to 
maintain tax deductions for certified NGOs.  The evaluation process was expected to be 
funded by fees from evaluated NGOs as well as member contributions and initial support from 
foundations. 
 
By 2005 more than 400 NGOs had been certified through a peer review process that involves 
hundreds of volunteer evaluators from member NGOs.  Roughly 10% of the applicants were 
initially denied certification, though many of them were certified in subsequent assessments.  
Those certified have been granted tax deductions for contributions received.   
 
Source:  R. A. Chamberlain, Regulating Civil Society: The Philippine Council for NGO 
Certification, Manila: PCNC.  Also see PCNC website at www.pcnc.com.ph. 
The PCNC experience demonstrates that codes of conduct and peer reviews can control 
the proliferation of fraudulent NGOs and build a shared base for recognizing good 
practice, though the certification process has also required substantial commitments of 
volunteer time and energy.  Such initiatives can catalyze cross-sector and society-wide 
debate on the elements of a code of conduct and help construct understanding and 
commitment to minimum standards.  State support in the form of tax relief invests the 
PCNC standards with the status of societal ideals.   
 
A second source of standards is the creation of negotiated domain standards that take into 
account the specialized experience and expertise of communities of organizations.  Such 
domain standards can be negotiated to set accountability expectations in multi-
organizational contexts that range from communities of organizations in the same sector, 
to campaign coalitions across local, national, and regional differences, to intersectoral 
partnerships that bring together business, government, civil society and other actors to 
solve shared problems.21  
 
Initiatives to build domain standards out of organizational experience and to certify 
compliance with those standards is becoming increasingly common for NGOs in many 
countries, from Pakistan and India to Australia and the United States.22  Box 2 briefly 
describes the Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia, which grew out of discussions 
among many NGOs concerned about fostering greater accountability in the sector. 
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Box 2.  Negotiating Sector Standards: The Code of Conduct for Ethiopia NGOs 
 
The Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia was developed collectively by NGOs in 1998.  It 
was formally endorsed by 165 national and international NGOs, which includes most NGOs 
operating in the country.  It was created to ensure transparency and accountability, improve 
quality of services at high standards, improve communication with NGO stakeholders, and 
encourage sharing experiences and joint learning. 
 
The Code of Conduct includes a series of norms related to community involvement, fairness and 
equity, ethics, transparency and accountability, governance, independence, communication and 
gender.  Examples of code provisions include: 
 
• Transparency and Accountability: 
o We shall maintain and make available to all concerned bodies periodic audit, 
financial and activities reports. 
o We shall conform to the constitution, laws, rules and regulations of the Government 
of Ethiopia and, where necessary, lobby for change. 
• Good Governance: 
o We shall have a written constitution or a memorandum of association that clearly 
defines our mission, our objectives and our organizational structure. 
o All of our organizational transactions shall be free of conflicts of personal and 
professional interest. 
 
The Code Observance section provides for the Code Observance Committee to hear complaints 
and decide about code violations, including membership suspension or cancellation if necessary. 
 
Sources:  www.crdaethiopia.org/Code%20of%20Conduct/CoC.htm; 
www.gdrc.org/ngo/codesofconduct/africa-code.html; 
hq.unhabitat.org/cdrom/TRANSPARENCY/html/box49.html 
 
Creating sector standards can provide opportunities for constructive debate about CSO 
practices and problems as well as avenues to greater financial support from many 
sources.  But building detailed standards is not easy.  It is often relatively easy to come to 
agreement on general principles, but creating detailed standards and mechanisms for 
sanctioning violations of those standards may be very difficult.  The NGO Code for 
Ethiopia, for example, created a Committee of NGO leaders and civil society leaders to 
hear complaints and take action on Code violations. 
 
A third source of accountability standards is organizational strategic choice.  
Organizations may have considerable leeway in defining how much they will emphasize 
accountability to various stakeholders, particularly when their stakeholders vary in 
interests and power.  Those choices have consequences, of course.  CSOs cannot choose 
to ignore stakeholders without legal, moral or prudential risks.  But CSOs often make less 
use of space for choice than they could.  In the absence of strategic thinking about the 
issues of accountability, some stakeholders receive much more attention than others.  It is 
common for donors and government regulators to have their accountability claims 
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honored, while the claims of less powerful constituencies like poor and marginalized 
beneficiaries receive less attention.23  While CSOs often complain about having to 
comply with donor- or government-imposed accountability standards, they often give 
little attention to the possibilities of balancing those demands with increased attention to 
other stakeholders’ claims.   
 
But such imbalances are not automatic.  Organizations can make strategic choices about 
accountabilities to different stakeholders and even create systems that enhance the 
abilities of low-power stakeholders to influence performance.  Box 3 describes the 
strategic choices of PRIA in India to manage conflicting accountabilities to stakeholders 
in civil society capacity-building initiatives. 
 
 
Box 3.  Organizational Strategic Choice:  PRIA and CSO Capacity-Building  
 
PRIA (The Society for Participatory Research in Asia) began to provide organization 
development consulting services to Indian civil society organizations and movements in the 
early 1990s.  At the time, many international donors sought to strengthen the capacities of the 
CSOs they supported.  Several approached PRIA to do organizational diagnoses of their CSO 
partners that were perceived as having difficulties. 
 
PRIA hoped to develop organizational capacity building as a major program—but its leaders 
also saw tensions between the interests of donors and CSO clients.  If PRIA reported on CSO 
weaknesses to donors, CSO funding might be at risk.  If CSO clients believed that their 
funding was at risk, they would not speak frankly to PRIA consultants.  PRIA believed that 
capacity building work based on “public relations” descriptions of CSO problems would not 
have many valuable long-term impacts.   
 
To manage this dilemma, PRIA decided that they would not accept assignments unless donors 
agreed that the diagnostic reports would go to CSO clients rather than to their donors.  Some 
donors rejected this policy; others agreed that their control over the reports might undermine 
the capacity-building agenda.  PRIA’s strategic choice to prioritize accountability to clients 
over donors resulted in no support from some donors—but it enhanced PRIA’s legitimacy 
with CSO clients and with other donors. 
 
Source: Personal communication with PRIA Staff.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability standards can be articulated at the organizational, domain, and societal 
levels.  Where there is widespread agreement on the kinds of goals and activities that are 
most appropriate, legislation or “customs having the force of law” can codify 
expectations into societal ideals.  Where the issues are less well-understood or more 
controversial, societal agreement on which to ground legislated regulations or normative 
standards may not yet exist.  When innovative responses to poorly understood problems 
are needed to build the base for societal ideals, domain negotiations to set standards 
based on experience across organizations or organizational strategic choices by those 
grappling with the problems may be more appropriate sources of standards.  The 
experience of such organizations may provide the base for domain negotiations, and the 
articulation of domain standards may be precursors to societal ideals.  In the sections that 
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follow, we focus on building accountability systems for organizations and domains 
because they offer CSOs opportunities to actively influence their own accountability and 
legitimacy.   
 
 
4. Constructing Organizational Accountability Systems 
 
The missions and strategies of civil society organizations are at the heart of defining their 
legitimacy and accountability.  Criteria for legitimacy and accountability vary across 
missions and strategies.  Service delivery CSOs may be required to demonstrate the 
quality and reach of their services and make themselves accountable to donors and 
service regulators to get critical resources.  Capacity building CSOs may work closely 
with clients to develop programs and so emphasize accountability to clients whose active 
cooperation is essential to co-producing enhanced capacities.  Advocacy CSOs may need 
to build legitimacy with both the constituents they represent and the targets they seek to 
influence.  Accountability to constituents is central to preserving their legitimacy as a 
voice for otherwise unheard populations; legitimacy with targets is necessary to 
effectively influencing them.  In the multi-stakeholder world of CSOs different missions 
may demand different priorities among stakeholder accountabilities.  
 
CSOs that do not grapple with the issues of legitimacy and accountability often pay more 
attention to stakeholders with loud voices and substantial power—such as donors and 
government agencies—and pay less attention to stakeholders with less clout—such as 
clients or agency staff.  In this section we turn explicitly to the possibilities of building 
systems for managing accountabilities to many stakeholders.  Such accountability 
systems include definitions of performance, identification of key stakeholders, tools for 
assessing performance, mechanisms for communicating those assessments, and vehicles 
for creating performance consequences for the CSO.   
 
Figure 1 summarizes the links among CSO strategies, activities and results.  The 
“strategic triangle” of value creation, legitimacy and support, and operational capacity on 
the left of the Figure reflects three critical questions that CSO leaders must answer in 
creating organizational strategy.  It is important for CSO leaders to define (1) what and 
how it will create value (such as services delivered, capacities built, or policies 
influenced), (2) how it can gain support and legitimacy for its work, and (3) how it will 
develop the operational capability to carry out its strategy.24  They must also figure out 
how these questions can be answered at the same time, ideally in ways that are congruent 
and mutual reinforcing. 
 
The CSO carries out activities to create value (such as health services, capacity-building 
workshops, or policy analyses) which in turn contribute to outcomes such as changed 
behavior by targets (such as better nutrition by mothers, more self-help by villagers, 
changed policies by legislators) which foster longer-term social impacts (such as 
healthier babies, improved village conditions, and improved government services).  
These elements together comprise the CSO’s value chain or change theory for 
accomplishing its strategy and mission, as indicated by the large arrows down the right of 
Figure 1.    
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Accountability systems assess information about activities, outputs, outcomes and 
impacts, report results to relevant stakeholders, and enable stakeholders to hold the CSO 
accountable.  Thus the dashed arrows from the accountability system reflect the use of 
performance information to enhance legitimacy and support, strengthen organizational 
capacity, and enhance value creation.   
 
Figure 1: Strategy, Accountability and Legitimacy  
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The strategic choice perspective focuses on strengthening CSO capacities to accomplish 
their missions.  CSOs can construct accountability systems that reinforce performance 
and mission accomplishment.  These systems may make use of a range of accountability 
mechanisms to enhance transparency, build stakeholder participation, assess performance 
results and respond to complaints and performance shortfalls.  Building accountability 
systems involves five tasks: (1) articulating strategies and value chains, (2) identifying 
and prioritizing organizational stakeholders, (2) setting standards and performance 
measures, (3) assessing and communicating performance results, and (4) creating 
mechanisms that enable performance consequences so stakeholders can hold the CSO 
accountable.  We consider each of these elements below and illustrate them with 
examples drawn from current initiatives around the world.   
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4.1 Articulating Strategies and Value Chains 
 
Clarifying CSO strategies for accomplishing their missions is a critical step in building 
accountability systems that support mission accomplishment.  Different strategies utilize 
different chains of activities, outputs and outcomes to produce desired long-term impacts.  
Service delivery (such as providing micro-credit loans), capacity building (such as 
training entrepreneurs), and policy advocacy (such as promoting small business-friendly 
legislation) are strategies that imply quite different activities and desired results, though 
all three might be used to enhance the incomes of impoverished populations.  The 
strategic triangle in Figure 1 suggests that the value to be created is linked to approaches 
to generating legitimacy and support and constructing operational capability.  So, 
articulating the CSO’s fundamental strategy is an important step in building an 
accountability system. 
 
Strategies usually include a theory about how the CSO’s activities will produce long-term 
impacts.  Such theories have been discussed as “change theories” or “logic models” or 
“value chains.” 25  In essence they describe how the CSO believes its work will make a 
difference.  CSOs have considerable control over the nature of their immediate outputs, 
such as loans provided or workshops delivered.  They have less control over how those 
outputs are utilized by their clients or targets, and still less influence over how the 
behavior of clients and targets interacts with other factors over the longer term to produce 
social impacts.  PRIA’s value chain for CSO organization development, for example, 
assumed that effective organization development depended on creating client 
relationships that enabled frank discussion of organizational problems.  Their theory 
implies that client mistrust would undermine the outcomes necessary to achieve desired 
impacts.  Articulating strategies and their value chains is central to understanding points 
at which accountability to various stakeholders is critical to mission accomplishment. 
 
4.2 Identifying and Prioritizing Organizational Stakeholders 
 
Who are the key stakeholders for CSOs?  Answers to this question vary considerably 
across CSOs, depending on their missions and strategies, the contextual forces they face, 
and the capacities they bring to bear.  The stakeholders that are critical to disaster relief 
or service provision may be quite different from those central to local capacity building 
or to policy advocacy.  Since CSOs have many diverse stakeholders—donors, members, 
regulators, clients, allies, staffs, targets—trying to be fully accountable to all of them may 
be a recipe for paralysis or constant firefighting.  Prioritizing accountabilities can be vital 
to mission accomplishment. 
 
The strategic triangle offers a simple way to identify and map stakeholders who have 
important accountability claims by focusing on value creation, legitimacy and support, 
and operational capability.  Figure 2 illustrates using the strategic triangle to identify 
stakeholders of an international NGO that builds the capacities of marginalized 
communities, Southern NGOs, and local government agencies.    
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Figure 2.  Capacity-Building INGO Strategic Triangle and Stakeholders 
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Source:  Brown, L. D., M. H. Moore, & J. P. Honan (2004). Building Strategic Accountability 
Systems for International NGOs. AccountAbility Forum 1(2): 31-43. 
 
When the relevant stakeholders have been identified, CSO leaders can assess the nature 
and importance of accountabilities on at least three dimensions.  First, is the CSO 
accountable on legal grounds?  Some stakeholders can use law and the courts to hold the 
CSO accountable, such as suing it to compel compliance with contractual obligations to 
provide donors with audited accounts.  Second, is the CSO accountable on normative 
grounds?  Some stakeholders can call for accountability on grounds of values and norms 
held by the CSO, such as publicizing CSO behavior that is inconsistent with its public 
value and norm commitments.  And third, is the CSO accountable on prudential or 
practical grounds?  Some stakeholders can exact high costs for accountability failures, as 
in donors refusing to re-fund programs.   
 
Stakeholders may have claims on several grounds.  Donors often have strong claims on 
legal and prudential grounds, while clients may have strong moral claims but little 
prudential clout or legal standing.  One approach has been to assess stakeholders on all 
three questions and then combine those assessments for an overall priority rating.26 
Identifying stakeholders and establishing priorities among them is essential to 
constructing accountability systems that support mission and strategy achievement.  
Many CSOs recognize the temptation to pay more attention to stakeholders with strong 
prudential and legal claims and pay less attention to value-based claims, even when those 
values are at the core of CSO missions.  Recognizing and discussing those tensions is 
central to constructing accountability systems that realistically support CSO missions.   
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4.3 Setting Standards and Measuring Performance  
 
Accountability systems depend on agreements about performance and how it can be 
measured.  Measuring performance is particularly challenging when CSOs seek to 
accomplish long-term social impacts, since it is difficult to measure precisely such 
impacts or the contributions of various actors to them.  Articulating value chains provides 
a framework to evaluate indicators for assessing immediate outputs, client outcomes, and 
longer-term impacts—but the causes of those indicators are increasingly difficult to 
assess as they become more distant from CSO activities. 
 
The challenges of assessing social and environmental impacts have received increasing 
attention in the last ten years.  While many initiatives have examined ways to assess 
immediate outputs of programs, others have paid attention to their outcomes in terms of 
changed behavior on the part of program targets.27  The work of organizations like the 
New Economics Foundation, AccountAbility, and Keystone, for example, have 
contributed to expanding awareness of measures and standards for assessing social and 
environmental impacts.28  With cooperation from a number of universities, the 
practitioner-led Social Performance Management system (SPM) supports microfinance 
institutions to measure social as well as financial performance and to build new forms of 
accountability.29   
 
It is not uncommon for donors to require evaluation plans for the programs they fund.  
But donor interests differ from interests of other stakeholders, and their evaluations may 
not serve other stakeholders well.  Indeed, some CSOs collect information required by 
donors but create quite different systems to support their own learning.30  The challenges 
of creating performance measurement systems that serve multiple stakeholders have 
inspired a number of innovations, such as the OSANGO assessment system briefly 
described in Box 4.  Note that this approach emphasizes working with stakeholders—
particularly clients and beneficiaries—to define problems, identify indicators and 
measures of impact, and assess and interpret results.  The system is designed to foster 
joint learning about program outcomes and impacts, stressing enhanced independence 
and capacity of program clients as well as learning for the CSO.   
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Box 4.  Organizational Self-Analysis for NGOs (OSANGO) 
 
This self-managed assessment system was created by Indian NGO support organizations to 
enable NGOs to assess their performance with respect to their missions, values, and operating 
principles.  It offers a framework for analyzing organizational structures and processes and 
can provide computerized feedback that compares the organization to others. 
 
OSANGO emphasizes NGO accountabilities to stakeholders and particularly to beneficiaries 
by encouraging agencies to: 
• Be aware of statutory obligations and other legal requirements; 
• Develop goals and objectives in cooperation with stakeholders; 
• Engage in dialogue with beneficiaries to solve local problems; 
• Seek feedback on program impacts from beneficiaries and other stakeholders; and 
• Measure performance in cooperation with other stakeholders. 
 
Source:  Jagadananda (2004). The Need for Self Assessment-Reflection: Organizational Self-
Analysis for NGOs (OSANGO) in South Asia. AccountAbility Forum (2, Summer): 98-106. 
For additional information on OSANGO: http://www.cysd.org/osango.htm
Creating a performance measurement system that makes sense to the CSO is an important 
step, but it does not guarantee that the resulting measurements will be adequate for all.  
The OSANGO system emphasizes working with other stakeholders to develop goals and 
objectives, generate information about impacts, and interpret the results.  Often the value 
of information for accountability purposes will turn on the extent to which the CSO has 
negotiated agreement on performance measurement with key stakeholders early in the 
process. Early negotiations can help the CSO and its stakeholders define desirable 
performance in the same general terms.  
 
4.4 Assessing and Communicating Performance  
 
The results of CSO performance can be assessed in many ways. The data from 
performance indicators developed in the prior step must be analyzed, interpreted and 
communicated to key stakeholders if they are to hold the organization accountable.  Some 
organizations invest time and resources in self-evaluations, deploying staff to collect and 
analyze information about program performance and how much their activities have the 
impacts intended.  Others commission external evaluations (or have evaluations imposed 
on them) to gain the advantage of technically sophisticated and organizationally 
independent feedback.   
 
Communications include disclosure statements, annual reports, or publication of internal 
and external evaluations.  Writing reports in English may be useful for donors, but it does 
not help clients who are not literate English-speakers understand what the CSO is doing.  
The critical issue here is making information available in forms that are comprehensible 
and useful to various stakeholders.  Stakeholder diversity means, of course, that some 
will find communications more difficult to decipher than others. 
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An important initiative in assessing and reporting CSO impacts has been the rise of social 
auditing.  Much of the initial work in this area has focused on private sector initiatives, 
but it is highly relevant to CSO work as well.  Social auditing develops indicators and 
tools for assessing social and environmental impacts as well as economic results.31
 
A particularly interesting innovation in the area of assessing and communicating 
performance is the Keystone initiative, described in Box 5.  This initiative builds on the 
assumption that better performance and reporting standards will expand the resources 
available for social programs. 
 
 
 
Box 5.  The Keystone Initiative: Shared Standards of Performance 
 
Keystone Reporting has been organized to build a widely accepted reporting standard for 
social and environmental results that can be used to improve CSO performance, strengthen 
accountabilities, and consequently expand social investment.  To do this it fosters multi-
stakeholder dialogues on the need for accountability and transparency and action research to 
build a reporting standards framework in a number of pilot projects with partners around the 
world. 
 
The reporting framework focuses on the competencies of CSOs that are predictive of future 
performance.  Features of the proposed standard include: 
• Ratcheted reporting, so that more mature CSOs meet higher standards; 
• Open, inclusive and participatory processes to enable mutual learning; 
• Capacity development emphasis rather than picking winners; 
• Capability-based analysis focused on likely future performance; 
• Graduated external verification, from self to peer to external assessments; and  
• Flexibility in prioritizing rating aspects, so potential donors can assess CSOs according to 
their particular concerns. 
 
Source: Bonbright, D. (2004). NGO Accountability and Performance: Introducing ACCESS. 
AccountAbility Forum (2, Summer): 4-13.  See also www.accountability.org.uk.  
If Keystone achieves its goals, it will influence both the substance of result reporting on 
social and environmental CSO programs and the context in which those results are 
communicated.  It will help create shared standards for assessing the capabilities of 
CSOs, enhance the capabilities of CSOs and their abilities to learn from their work, and 
enable potential social investors to identify, assess and support effective programs.  Its 
founders hope that these changes will enable funding for social results on a much larger 
scale than is now possible. 
 
4.5 Creating Performance Consequences 
 
Since the interests and capacities of CSO stakeholders vary, making information 
available to all of them in the same format does not ensure that they can hold the CSO 
accountable.  While government officials and donor agency staff may be quite happy 
with audited accounts or external evaluation reports, grassroots constituents may not have 
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the languages (e.g., English) or the skills (e.g., accounting) to interpret the reports.  Even 
if they understand the reports they may not have the power or the resources to compel 
attention to their concerns.  “Creating performance consequences” assumes some degree 
of voice and influence from the relevant stakeholders and some power to ensure that 
CSOs have strong incentives to listen to relevant stakeholders.    
 
This problem is often recognized by CSOs—but less often solved.  Box 6 describes an 
initiative by an international NGO concerned with the difficulties of managing 
information from local assessments while promoting enhanced local accountability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 6.  Accountability, Learning and Planning System (ALPS) 
 
This system was created by ActionAid to help focus program reporting and evaluation on 
important outcomes.  It has been designed to bring together clients, partners and staff to learn 
from experience.   
 
The ALPS process emphasizes appraisal, strategy formation, program review and annual 
reflections in cooperation with community groups and partners, with a special emphasis on 
downward accountability.  It includes elements to ensure: 
• Participation by primary stakeholders in various phases of work; 
• Transparency, sharing and reporting across stakeholders; 
• Recognizing different forms of literacy, communication, and reporting; 
• Emphasis on learning with stakeholders about achievements and failures; and 
• Downward accountability to poor people. 
 
For additional information about ALPS: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/800/alps.html
Since development is often understood as “empowering” grassroots constituents, creating 
the context for mutual assessment and joint learning with them is an attractive goal—but 
not one that is easily accomplished.  Accountability to clients and beneficiaries is an 
empty term if they do not have the power to demand attention to their concerns.  But that 
power does not happen by accident or by default.  The ALPS experience suggests that 
mutual learning and accountability has to be explicitly woven into programs and 
implemented with considerable commitment if it is to be effective. 
 
4.6 Organizational Learning, Operational Capacity and Legitimacy 
 
The information generated by accountability systems has a number of uses.  It offers 
opportunities to organizations operating in complex and changing contexts for 
organizational learning from information about program outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
This information can help the CSO learn what works at the operational level as well as 
how accurately its theories of change in fact predict and explain results.  In Figure 1 the 
dashed arrow from the accountability system to the creating value aspect of the CSO 
strategy reflects the organization’s ability to adapt by making use of organizational 
learning.32   
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Within the organization, information from the accountability system can be used for 
operational capacity-building, clarifying roles and responsibilities and defining 
performance expectations to focus organizational energies where they will have the 
greatest impact. The dashed arrow in Figure 1 from the accountability system to 
operational capability indicates the possibility of using new information to foster more 
effective performance. 
 
Finally, the existence of clear standards and information about performance can be used 
to strengthen internal and external legitimacy of the CSO, as indicated by the dashed 
arrow from the accountability system to legitimacy and support.  The more clearly the 
organization can produce data that indicates mission-related performance and impacts, 
the more credible the case for legitimacy.  Critics may challenge the relevance or value of 
the mission–but at a minimum the CSO can demonstrate that its actions are consistent 
with its words–that it “walks its own talk” in behaving consistently with its values. 
 
In short, constructing accountability systems at the organizational level offers CSO 
leaders opportunities to assess the importance of various stakeholders and design systems 
that align internal and external accountabilities to press for mission accomplishment. 
Defining organizational accountabilities makes it possible for key stakeholders to support 
accomplishment of critical objectives.  There is no complete freedom to decide which 
accountabilities will be primary—accountability choices have consequences, particularly 
when powerful stakeholders get less than they want. But donors and regulators may 
recognize the importance of accountability to other stakeholders—particularly those 
whose capacity and empowerment is the rationale for the programs they support.  There 
is enough latitude for many CSO leaders, given chances to negotiate with donors and 
other stakeholders, to build accountability systems that support and reinforce their 
strategic commitments.   
 
 
5. Building Domain Accountability Systems 
  
Civil society legitimacy and accountability systems can also be constructed at the domain 
level, so that communities of organizations agree about appropriate standards, practices, 
and relations with key stakeholders.  While organizational accountability systems focus 
on the strategies and activities of individual organizations, domain accountability systems 
require interorganizational negotiations to define standards for community members.  
Often domain expectations about legitimacy and accountability are developed out of the 
experiences of their members, so agreement on standards and practices emerges from 
past practice.   Domain standards may become embedded in wider social norms and legal 
standards, and so evolve into societal ideals of legitimacy and accountability embedded 
in laws, norms and expectations.   
 
Interorganizational domains take many forms.  For example, much of the attention on 
increasing the legitimacy and accountability of civil society organizations has focused on 
domains that involve organizations from the same sector.  Members of sector domains 
carry out similar activities and have similar stakes in creating standards of legitimacy and 
accountability, such as the members of the development NGO sector in the Philippines.  
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A second important domain for civil society organizations is interorganizational 
campaigns to influence powerful actors like governments, corporations, and 
intergovernmental organizations.  Campaigns may involve a wide range of concerned 
actors, such as the civil society organizations from local, national and international levels 
that have campaigned to stop dam building in India and Brazil.  A third form of 
interorganizational domain is focused on a problem whose solution requires resources 
from many actors.  Such problem domains may require standards based on legitimacy 
and accountability expectations negotiated across sectors and levels, such as the World 
Commission on Dams which was created to assess experience with large dams and define 
future standards and practices.  Problem domains may require extended efforts to manage 
relations within the domain as well as with external stakeholders.     
 
Constructing domain legitimacy and accountability systems requires (1) defining the 
domain and its stakeholders, (2) negotiating standards, codes and performance measures, 
(3) creating domain implementation organizations, and (4) enabling performance 
consequences for domain actors and stakeholders.  Each of these elements is considered 
briefly below, and illustrated with experiences from around the world.   
  
5.1 Defining the Domain and its Stakeholders 
 
Defining a domain requires that its members perceive common interests that justify both 
a substantial investment of time and energy and the loss of organizational autonomy from 
creating new standards.  Part of domain definition is building recognition among domain 
members that domain definition and collective action is in their interest.  An initial 
question is who is inside and who is outside this domain, and how will it advance 
members’ interests to participate.  For the Philippine Council on NGO Certification 
(PCNC), for example, an important early question was whether NGOs with few or no 
deductible contributions had any interest in the tax reform that threatened those 
contributions.  The domain would have been much smaller if they had decided not to join 
the alliance of CSOs dependent on such contributions from businesses or wealthy 
individuals.  
 
The domain definition process also requires clarifying the nature, interests and priority of 
external stakeholders.  Who are the stakeholders that affect or are affected by the 
domain’s value creation activities?  What stakeholders are important to the longer term 
legitimacy and support for the domain as a whole?  External stakeholders for the PCNC 
domain, for example, included international donors, the business community, other 
government agencies and the general public concerned about the development roles of 
civil society in the Philippines.  
 
While similarities and interdependencies of domain members may be easy to recognize 
intellectually, it is often difficult to mobilize members’ resources for collective action.  It 
is unlikely that civil society actors in the Philippines would have organized PCNC in the 
absence of the threat to civil society resources posed by fraudulent NGOs and the 
proposed tax reform.  So, internal and eternal threats may be critical to catalyzing domain 
definition initiatives. 
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The creation of clearer standards for a sector domain is often a consequence of external 
criticism of the activities of prominent sector members.  Box 7 describes the efforts to 
create shared standards for US child sponsorship NGOs.  While leaders of some of those 
NGOs had been discussing shared standards and enhanced accountability for many years, 
serious commitment to developing those standards was generated by a media exposé that 
threatened their access to donors. 
 
 
 
 
Box 7.  Accreditation for the Child Sponsorship Sector 
 
Child sponsorship NGOs raise funds from private donors by providing opportunities to “adopt 
a child” in a developing country.  Donors pay a monthly fee to enable the child to gain access 
to various resources and services.  The largest US child sponsorship NGOs had been 
discussing shared standards for some time, but work began in earnest after a national 
newspaper stories claimed they were not living up to their promises to donors. 
 
The NGOs recognized their continuing vulnerability to standards invented by others if they 
did not set their own.  Agreement about basic principles was simple, but agreeing on 
indicators and support for the needed resources involved months of negotiations.  Eventually 
the five biggest NGOs agreed that independent certification by an independent agency was 
essential as a useful “seal of approval.”  Finding a certifying agency with the capacity to work 
internationally in development settings required further months of exploration and 
negotiation.   
 
After much debate the NGOs agreed that Social Accountability International (SAI) would 
serve as the certification agency under the auspices of InterAction, the umbrella association of 
US development NGOs.  By 2005 SAI had carried out studies and certified all the five 
founding agencies as meeting shared standards.  The example set by the child sponsorship 
organizations has also catalyzed an ongoing revision of InterAction’s accountability standards 
and processes for its other members as well.  
 
Source: Phillips, Michael. Big Charities Pursue Certification to Quell Fears of Funding 
Abuses, Wall Street Journal, March, 9 2005.  
Leaders of the child sponsorship NGOs found that negotiating shared principles and 
standards helped their organizations learn from one another as well as protect themselves 
from arbitrary performance standards from outside critics.  They also built relationships 
that could be used for alliances on other topics in the future.  The utilization of a 
respected independent agency with a long track record in assessing the social impacts of 
businesses and other agencies helped to establish the credibility of the certification 
process. 
 
Building accountability systems for civil society campaigns can be complicated by the 
need to include diverse allies.  Campaign success often depends on articulating shared 
strategies and accountabilities for implementing them across large differences in interest 
and perspective.  Interorganizational domains seldom have well-developed shared 
authority structures and civil society organizations often place high value on 
organizational autonomy.  But civil society campaigns to influence powerful actors—
governments, corporations, international agencies—require coalitions that can respond 
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quickly to implement campaign strategies and tactics, and in some cases develop ways to 
protect their members when they seek to influence opponents unwilling to abide by the 
rule of law.  Box 8 describes some challenges involved in defining accountabilities in the 
civil society campaign to challenge human rights violations in Peru.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 8.  Accountability in Peru’s Human Rights Campaign 
he Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos in Peru evolved out of local and national 
nder pressure from government- and opposition-sponsored terrorists, campaigning for 
 Peru, rural branches (often in the most danger) had difficulty influencing national 
ource:  Youngers, C. A., & Peacock, S. C. (2002). Peru's Coordinadora Nacional de 
 
T
efforts to combat human rights violations by government agencies, death squads, and Shining 
Path terrorists from 1985-2000.  The Coordinadora eventually included more than 60 member 
organizations from both the capital city and the rural provinces. 
 
U
human rights became very dangerous in Peru.  The Coordinadora’s ability to survive and 
remain effective depended on building trust and unity within the coalition and emphasizing its 
credibility and moral authority.  The coalition members agreed to reject violence, remain 
independent from the state and political parties, commit to democratic society and oppose the 
death penalty.  Biannual meetings approved new members and future priorities.  To maintain 
the credibility of the coalition, it had to effectively resist efforts by both government and 
opposition to infiltrate its members and capture its decision-making processes. 
 
In
decisions.  The Coordinadora created an Executive Committee with more rural members and 
required that the Committee make decisions by consensus to preserve coalition cohesiveness 
and accountability to rural members.  The Coordinadora also built relations with international 
supporters and other sectors of Peruvian civil society to enhance their influence in challenging 
both the Shining Path and authoritarian governments. 
 
S
Derechos Humanos: A Case Study of Coalition Building. Washington, DC: Washington 
Office on Latin America. 
 
Bringing domain members together to build common strategies, standards and 
he external stakeholders for campaign alliances may include targets of the campaign, 
international concern about human rights violations in Peru.  
accountability expectations becomes more difficult as the diversity and conflict within 
the domain increase and as the dangers from outside stakeholders increase.  The higher 
the tensions among members, the more concern with legitimacy and accountability and 
the more resources and time required to build agreements on domain strategy and 
performance expectations.  It was not easy to build shared standards among the child 
sponsorship organizations, which had histories of competing with each other.  It was 
more difficult to construct shared strategies and tactics across differences among 
potential Coordinadora members, particularly when agents of external stakeholders like 
Shining Path revolutionaries sought to become members so they could focus attention on 
government human rights violations and away from their own abuses.   
 
T
such as the Government of Peru and Shining Path, other potential allies or opponents, and 
the general public.  The Coordinadora campaign, for example, benefited from widespread 
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This challenge of negotiating and implementing shared domain strategies and standards is 
ften even greater in problem domainso , where sector perspectives and histories of serious 
ternal stakeholders in the Applegate Valley Partnership included groups that had been 
ghting with each other for years—but had come to a stalemate that served the interests 
xplicitly defining the 
omain and its members as well as identifying external stakeholders with accountability 
 
conflict may separate the participants.33  In such situations participants may see each 
other as the primary problem, so even getting them to sit at the same table may be 
difficult.  Box 9 describes the definition of a problem domain alliance across strongly 
held differences on the management of ecosystems in the Northwestern United States.  In 
this case the construction of a shared accountability system required coming to terms 
with histories of violent confrontation and extended deadlocks in the court system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 9.  Cooperation in an Ecosystem Management Problem Domain 
 
ent to many 
bservers.  Creating standards and decision-making processes for sustainable management of 
 
ber 
 all the parties, representatives of 
ach group began to explore the possibilities of jointly managing the ecosystem in ways that 
 
s 
The creation of the Applegate Valley Partnership was a startling developm
o
the forests of the Applegate Valley and watershed in Oregon required agreement among
highly polarized stakeholders.  Conflicts over where and how much logging could be allowed 
without destroying the local ecology had escalated into violent confrontations among tim
companies, environmentalists, and forest service agents.  Resorting to litigation had produced 
a deadlock that served the interests of none of the parties. 
 
Building on the negative consequences of the deadlock for
e
would sustain it—a goal valued by all the parties.  Defining standards for sustainable forest 
management that would enable viable economic activity while preserving the forest for future
generations involved extensive negotiations and significant changes in the preferred practice
of many participants.  Those negotiations eventually created innovative institutions and 
processes for forest management and future decision making as well as relationships of 
mutual respect and trust among the participants.  The resulting management system and 
decisions enabled joint resolution of many of their earlier conflicts in ways that were 
accountable to each other as well as to the wider community and to future generations.   
 
Source: See Weber, E. P. (2003). Bringing Society Back In: Grassroots Ecosystem 
Management, Accountability and Sustainable Communities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
In
fi
of none of them.  So, defining the domain in terms that might enable more flexible 
governance was a reluctant recognition that none of the parties could win all they wanted.  
External stakeholders to this domain included future generations that would benefit from 
preserving the ecosystem as well as many residents of the Valley.   
 
A central element in building domain accountability systems is e
d
claims.  In all three of these examples, the value of domain collective action was not 
obvious to all domain members at the outset; many agreed to participate only after 
considerable persuasion.  But many also recognized, as domain definition progressed, 
that they wanted to be inside rather than outside the emerging domain definition. 
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5.2 Negotiating Standards, Codes and Performance Measures 
 
Agreement on the existence of a shared domain and common interests within that domain 
erformance measures requires moving beyond overall principles and values to define 
he domain who will 
e constrained and shaped by those standards, and (2) stakeholders whose interests affect 
embers, the more 
lleng g the negotiations become.  Both assessments of the need and ability to pay 
osts for developing a code of conduct for child sponsorship organizations varied 
is a critical first step.  However, developing shared standards, codes of conduct and 
p
specifics, and often “the devil is in the details.”  While there is considerable agreement on 
standards and measures around issues like governance and financial controls for civil 
society organizations,34 there is much less agreement on what are appropriate 
performance measures across the bewildering variety of activities—from relief to 
services to capacity building to advocacy—that CSOs carry out.  In addition, some of 
these outcomes and impacts are difficult to measure, invisible in the short-term, and 
influenced by many factors beyond the domain.  Therefore, the technical demands of 
measuring some kinds of civil society performance are formidable.   
 
Articulating a set of effective domain standards and performance measures involves 
negotiating agreements with two sets of actors: (1) the members of t
b
or are affected by domain activity.  Box 10 describes a project to create standards for 
humanitarian organizations operating in disaster relief situations in a process that 
involved hundreds of domain members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 10. Standards for Humanitarian Action: The Sphere Project 
 
Humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement developed the Sphere 
tors to guide 
acy.”  Its 
s 
Os, UN 
greement 
Project in 1997 to provide minimum standards and performance indica
umanitarian action, “from initial assessment through to coordination and advoch
website describes it as “three things: a handbook, a broad process of collaboration and an 
expression of commitment to quality and accountability.”  Its handbook also include
standards in four technical areas that are critical to humanitarian work. 
 
The development of the Sphere standards built on a wide range of experiences with 
humanitarian and disaster relief work.  More than 300 organizations from 60 countries 
ontributed to the project, including representatives of Northern and Southern NGc
agencies, and academic institutions.  This wide participation helped to create broad a
on best practices both inside and outside the sector.  The resulting materials have been 
described by relief workers as central to their practice.  
 
Source: http://www.sphereproject.org; Shea, C. and S. Sitar (2004). NGO Accreditation and 
Certification: The Way Forward. Washington, DC, USAID: PVC-ASHA. 
  
The more standards and codes affect vital interests of domain m
cha in
c
considerably across domain members.  The eventual agreement to go forward was the 
product of much debate and discussion.  The definition of the Coordinadora’s role and 
standards for membership was hotly contested by sympathizers of Shining Path, who felt 
the coalition should focus on government abuses.  Negotiating standards and indicators of 
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success shape the stakes and the roles of domain members, so those negotiations can be 
highly charged. 
 
Agreement among domain members must often be supplemented by negotiations with 
external stakeholders, particularly if the legitimacy of the domain is in question.  In the 
phere Project, UN and other donor acceptance of the standards was needed to mobilize 
Domain accountability systems often require the creation of new organizational 
ds significant resources.  Often 
gional and national umbrella organizations play critical roles in creating such 
S
resources as well as to coordinate action on the ground.  The agreements on roles and 
responsibilities within the Coordinadora were pivotal to its credibility with target 
agencies, such as the Government of Peru and international agencies, whose decisions 
spelled success or failure for its objectives.  Creating standards and measures to enhance 
legitimacy requires credibility with external as well as internal stakeholders.   
 
5.3 Creating Domain Implementation Organizations  
 
arrangements, particularly when implementation deman
re
organizations.  Common patterns include sector associations, issue alliances and 
coalitions, independent accreditation agencies, and information-sharing organizations.  
These organizations adopt a variety of approaches to assess and communicate member 
adherence to domain standards and codes, including self assessment, peer assessment by 
representatives of similar organizations, certification by independent agencies, or 
publication of information or external assessments.   
 
Sector associations that develop codes can use a variety of tools for monitoring and 
assessing compliance.35  Many ask their members to do self assessments and then report 
n their compliance.  For example, InterAction in the US and the Lesotho Council of o
NGOs require their members to assess their compliance with the association’s code of 
conduct every year.  This approach is inexpensive in terms of time and resources of the 
association, but it relies heavily on the commitment of members to carry out a serious 
assessment.  The Australian Council for International Development adds a complaints 
mechanism to a self-reporting system, so that members of the public have a vehicle for 
raising questions about member violations and serious sanctions for those found to be in 
violation of the standards.36  This addition increases the likelihood that member 
performance can be challenged.   
 
When domain members are more diverse, issue alliances and coalitions may be created to 
provide an organizational base for accountability.  Alliances involve long-term 
ollaboration, while coalitions often bring together diverse parties concerned about c
shorter-term objectives.  The Coordinadora, for example, began as a short-term coalition 
and evolved into a longer-term alliance as the challenges to human rights evolved with 
succeeding regimes in Peru.  In some cases, members may be created by the alliance 
rather than vice versa.  Box 11 describes Transparency International as an alliance of 
reform organizations in many different countries that is committed to increasing 
accountability to anti-corruption standards generally—but it has created and implemented 
an internal accountability system as well. 
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A third organizational arrangement for domain accountability is to use independent 
Box 11. Transparency International and Alliance Accountability 
 
Transparency International (TI) was created to foster anti-corruption reform around the world, 
particularly as corruption undermines development activity.  It has created about 90 
independent and locally-governed chapters that meet its criteria for certification.   TI’s 
mission emphasizes enhancing the accountability of financial dealings around the world, and 
so it is highly vulnerable to accusations of corruption or fraud among its members. 
 
The criteria for chapter certification include agreement on central values and compliance with 
guiding principles that include non-partisanship, non-exposure of individual cases of 
corruption, independence from funders, and developing and complying with a chapter code of 
conduct.  These elements seek to encourage local independence in reform strategy while 
protecting the credibility of the international movement. 
 
Source: Galtung, F. (2001). A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The Experience of 
Transparency International. The Third Force. A. Florini. Tokyo and Washington, Japan Center 
for International Exchange and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17-47; and  
Shea, C. and S. Sitar (2004). NGO Accreditation and Certification: The Way Forward. 
Washington, DC, USAID: PVC-ASHA. For additional information: 
http://www.transparency.org/
accreditation agencies to assess compliance with standards.  Some accreditation agencies 
mobilize domain members for peer review, as does the Philippine Council for NGO 
Certification.  Others create review boards that include representatives of many 
stakeholders, like the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy.   In both the Philippines and 
Pakistan cases, certification by the accreditation agency results in tax benefits to the 
NGO, and thereby creates a significant incentive for paying the costs of certification.  US 
child sponsorship agencies invested in a similar system by using an independent 
certification agency to create a credible “seal of approval” that would help mobilize 
private donations.    
 
A fourth option for generating and communicating information about domain standards is 
information-sharing agencies.  Such agencies make it easy to gather and compare data 
about CSO performance on various dimensions.  For example, Guidestar publishes data 
online about nonprofit sector members in the US and is beginning to provide similar 
services in other countries.  The Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance routinely 
collects and distributes information on hundreds of national and international NGOs, 
focusing on information of interest to private donors.  The “NGO-Watch” website makes 
available information on media coverage of the activities of NGOs active in the field of 
international policy advocacy.   
 
In short, the organizational arrangements for assessing and communicating results vary 
widely across domains.  This area has witnessed considerable growth and development 
over the last decade, as more and more civil society organizations and their stakeholders 
have grappled with approaches to dealing with legitimacy and accountability questions. 
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5.4 Enabling Domain Performance Consequences 
nsequences for poor performance are automatic in some of these organizational 
 
 
 
 or private 
 
 
erished or disenfranchised domain 
ents and constituents.  In some countries, low-power stakeholders may gain public 
 
Co
arrangements.  NGOs that lose their certification in the Philippines can no longer offer
x advantages to their donors, and so may lose precious resources.  Child sponsorship 
rganizations that fail to meet their standards risk losing donor support in a competitive
ndraising market.  When complaints against NGOs are validated by the Australian
uncil for International Development, their access to government funding
ta
o
fu
Co
donations is severely restricted.  Performance consequences can be enforced by
akeholders who have financial or political resources needed by domain participants. 
 is more difficult to create performance consequences in relationships with less
rganized or powerful stakeholders, such as impov
st
 
It
o
cli
voice through access to the media.  Newspapers in the US, for example, challenged the
ays in which child sponsorship organizations were serving the children they claimed to
pport.  Such public “naming and shaming” can be a powerful force to inc
 
 
 
t and active media are not available everywhere. 
w
su rease
ccountability for civil society domains as well as for public agencies and private firms.  
owever, it is not always in the interest of the media to speak up for poor and powerless 
opulations, and independen
a
H
p
 
Accountability to marginalized stakeholders may require altering or circumventing 
inequalities that suppress upward communication or sanctions.  Building power bridging 
arrangements is inherently challenging, though domains committed to downward 
accountability have created important opportunities for bridging such gaps.  Box 12 
describes an initiative that increased the accountability of international humanitarian 
relief organizations to the crisis-affected populations they serve.  Such populations are 
often displaced, destitute, and short on political power, and so are poorly positioned to 
call rich and powerful Northern agencies to account.  Even where performance standards 
have been clearly defined, it may be very difficult for such groups to publicly identify or 
sanction violations of standards. 
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 some circumstances stakeholders can raise questions and create perform
Box 12. Humanitarian Accountability Project International (HAP International) 
 
HAP International was created by an alliance of humanitarian relief organizations to 
strengthen the accountability of partners to grassroots groups affected by disasters.  They 
sought to clarify principles and mechanisms by which (1) their members could report their 
actions and be held responsible for them and (2) stakeholders could safely and legitimately 
report and gain redress for concerns, complaints, and abuses. 
 
HAP International created a membership-based, self-regulatory body that sets accountability 
standards; uses external, peer and self monitoring; supports member capacity building for 
their own accountability work plans; enables complaints about abuses; fosters systems for 
organizational and external complaints review; and reports annually on its activities and 
findings.  It offers new avenues by which poor and disenfranchised stakeholders in disaster 
and relief situations can create performance consequences for humanitarian agencies.   
 
Source: Callamard, A. (2004). “HAP International: A New Decisive Step toward 
Accountability.” AccountAbility Forum (2, Summer): 44-57. 
For additional information: http://www.hapinternational.org
In ance 
consequences through use of deliberative forums that give voice to stakeholders who 
might otherwise be silenced.  In South Africa, for example, the NGO community engaged 
in a series of discussions after the end of apartheid that drew national attention and 
comment on issues of civil society transparency and accountability.37  As domains 
involving civil society actors become increasingly recognized as central to societal 
problem-solving, the importance of having many voices hold those domains accountable 
will increase.  Tools for enabling discussion and debate among many stakeholders will be 
in greater demand.  For example, Box 13 describes the processes for multi-stakeholder 
dialogue about the future of civil society created by CIVICUS’ Civil Society Index.  Such 
forums may become important vehicles for enabling widespread participation in 
ssessing sector performance anda
 
 creating consequences to hold it accountable.   
Building domain legitimacy and accountability systems is more complicated than 
building organizational accountability systems, in part because of the many independent 
organizations involved and the need to create new organizational arrangements to 
implement collective action.  But it is also clear that the importance of the issues of 
legitimacy and accountability is catalyzing a wide range of initiatives to grapple with 
these issues across many regions and countries.  
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Box 13:  The CIVICUS Civil Society Index  
 
CIVICUS: The World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of more th
500 civil society organizations in more than 100 countries. Since its establishment in 199
CIVICUS has become a global advocate for civil society and the citizen participation it fosters. 
 
The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) is an action-research project that assesses the state of ci
society in countries around the world to create a better knowledge base and to encourage civil 
society strengthening initiatives.  The CSI is now being used by teams in more than 60 countries. 
 
CIVICUS has been developing the CSI methodology since 2000 to assess civil society on fo
dimensions: (1) structure, (2) external environment, (3) values and (4) impact on policies a
practices.  Findings in each country are then summarized in the form of a diamond.  When mapp
over time the diamond illustrates the development of civil society.  
 
 
 
Comparisons across countries suggest that the challenge of civil society legitimacy and 
accountability is central to more than half the countries participating so far in the Index. 
 
Country reports and summaries across countries are available at the CIVICUS website. 
Source: www.civicus.org
 
 
 
5.5 Domain Innovation and Evolution 
 
The effort to define domains and to develop standards of legitimacy and accountability 
can be costly in resources and time for those involved, but it may also catalyze domain 
arning about critical issues and the emergence of wider understanding and acceptance 
of core domain values and preferred practices.  As domain members examine which 
activities and outputs are associated with widely-valued outcomes and impacts, they may 
engage the wider community to generate norms and expectations that shape future 
activities and accountabilities.   
 
Domain organizations—sector associations, campaign coalitions, or intersectoral problem 
partnerships—are both products of domain negotiations and critical actors in 
implementing domain strategies to deal with external stakeholders.  They can be critical 
le
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vehicles for revising standards as domain members and external stakeholders respond to 
e ectations in practice.  
 
D
o
w  
d
p
t
can also set the stage for wider discussion and understanding of the issues that in turn 
e
 
 
untability 
 
We have focused on building legitimacy and accountability for individual civil society 
organizations and for multi-organization domains—arenas in which civil society actors 
can shape practices and expectations quite directly.  Building legitimacy and 
accountability at the societal level requires the involvement of many other actors.  
Constructing societal ideals for civil society accountability involves society-wide laws, 
norms, expectations and practices.  Sometimes the emergence of new legitimacy 
standards is gradual, as in the long struggles in some countries over political and civil 
rights to freedom of speech and assembly that are fundamental to civil society’s 
existence.38  Sometimes it may be dramatically swift, as in the tax reform in the 
Philippines that led to the creation of the Philippine Council for NGO Certification.  
Societal ideals are reflected in changing legislation and regulations, evolving societal 
norm
t
 
T truction 
process that grows out of
m ice; domain members in domain negotiations; and societal actors 
 defining societal ideals.  The subjective perceptions and expectations of different 
ctors are tested and refined in these debates and gradually consolidated into agreements 
l accountabilities and legitimacy expectations.  
stablished societal and domain standards create constraints on organizational strategic 
at existing institutions are perceived by at least some 
ergence of Transparency International reflected the 
merging experience with standards and exp
ebates over domain strategies and standards build on the strategies and learning of 
rganizations that are domain members and influence future organizational activities as 
ell.  Those debates can enable wider participation in understanding the issues facing the
omain and in defining appropriate and legitimate responses.  They may produce 
roblematic outcomes, such as government legislative interventions that restrict abuses at 
he cost of undermining domain capacities for innovation and social learning.  But they 
nable domain accountability systems to control abuses while fostering innovation.   
6.  Building Societal Legitimacy and Acco
s and values, and changing public perceptions and expectations about “the way 
hings are done.”   
he creation and maintenance of societal standards is a social and political cons
 interaction and debate among many actors—organization 
embers in strategic cho
in
a
about organization, domain and societa
E
choices, but organizational choices and influence on domains may also be the precursors 
to changes at the societal level as well.   
 
Civil society organizations sometimes are positioned to play central roles in the evolution 
of societal ideals.  Since civil society organizations depend on voluntary social energies, 
they are most likely to emerge in response to compelling values and problems.  So their 
emergence is often a signal th
itizens as inadequate.  Thus the emc
dissatisfaction of many influential citizens with the influence of corruption on 
international development initiatives.  Under some circumstances, civil society actors can 
have catalytic impacts on existing social ideals.  But they more commonly have to deal 
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with societal standards that exist—conforming to some, informing stakeholders about 
their position on others, manipulating existing symbols and expectations where 
ecessary.  Active construction of standards by strategic choice at the organization level 
ivil society organizations and domains.  We expect that those initiatives will be 
roadened a ivil society 
aders reco  sector and 
n
and by interorganizational negotiation at the domain level are usually more feasible than 
establishing new societal ideals, and so we have emphasized organizational and domain 
construction of accountability systems here.     
 
 
7.  Continuing Dilemmas 
 
here are many initiatives under way to strengthen the legitimacy and accountability of T
c
b nd strengthened over the next five years, as more and more c
gnize the critical importance of building the legitimacy of thele
clarifying the values, goals and stakeholders to which they will be accountable.  We also 
expect that some challenges will not succumb easily—if ever—to simple solutions.  
Some dilemmas will continue to be sources of tension and inspiration for further 
innovation. 
 
There will be a continuing need, for example, to balance the power differences among 
organizational and domain stakeholders.  As long as civil society organizations are 
working across the boundaries that separate unequal parties—the rich and the poor, the 
politically connected and the disenfranchised, the Global North and South—they will 
continue to face diverse demands for accountability—some explicit and others unspoken.  
To the extent that civil society agencies seek legitimacy with and accountability to less 
powerful stakeholders, they will need to create mechanisms and processes to balance the 
demands of unequally powerful stakeholders.  The tug and pull of different constituencies 
is inherent in the multiple allegiances of civil society organizations, but responding to 
upward, downward and lateral accountabilities can leave little time and energy for 
pursuing core priorities if leaders are not thoughtful about balancing those demands. 
 
To the extent that civil society organizations and domains foster action on complex social 
problems, an ongoing dilemma will be in measuring social performance when causes are 
ambiguous and multiply-determined.  We have suggested that performance measurement 
is a critical element in building organizational and domain accountability systems, since 
accountability requires delivering on performance promises.  Organizational, domain and 
societal learning to deal with complex social problems is at the heart of many civil 
society initiatives, and learning depends on information about outputs, outcomes and 
impacts of their activities.  For many complex problems unambiguous proof of impact 
will not be available, but civil society actors are gradually learning to make more 
convincing cases for their results and thereby buttress their claims for legitimacy and 
accountability to interested stakeholders. 
 
The call for clarifying strategies, performance measurement, and accountability to key 
stakeholders as bases for legitimacy has found responsive ears within civil society as well 
as in other sectors.  But clear standards and tightly-enforced accountability can 
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undermine other characteristics we value in civil society:  independence, diversity, 
flexibility, innovativeness, and willingness to take on unpopular causes.  The challenge 
will be to balance high standards with space for innovation, diversity and responsiveness.  
Had civil society actors remained accountable to the “best practice” of requiring 
collateral for small loans, no microcredit movement would have provided working capital 
to millions of micro-entrepreneurs.  In many cases “one size will not fit all,” and 
reserving room for innovation and invention will be central to solving local problems.  
 other cases failure to identify and follow key standards will undermine the 
s and impact of c
p
In
effectivenes ivil society initiatives.  
 
A related challenge is to use organizational learning to catalyze domain and societal 
development.  Civil society organizations can sometimes define their accountabilities on 
the basis of strategic choices, and so mobilize stakeholders to support their initiatives.  As 
areas of work evolve, however, the emergence of many organizations grappling with 
similar problems can create a range of practices--some better than others.  The 
development of a community of organizations with extensive experience can set the stage 
for negotiating domain standards or articulating new societal ideals.  Thus the rise of 
standards for development NGOs in Pakistan, the Philippines and Australia that are 
explicitly backed by government authority involves a shift from domain standards 
cial 
 society organizations and domains to answer 
enforced by NGOs to societal standards based in government regulations.  As areas of 
practice mature, civil society organizations may trade the autonomy of setting standards 
by strategic choice for the cohesion and coherence of standards set by domain negotiation 
or societal ideals. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We began with the idea that legitimacy and accountability has become a central issue for 
civil society.  It has emerged in response to several factors—some inherent in the nature 
of civil society and others emerging from developments in the emerging global society.  
The stakes of strengthening civil society claims to legitimacy and accountability are high: 
ivil society actors have growing capacities to play central roles in governance and soC
problem solving.  But their legitimacy is central to those capacities.  That legitimacy 
depends on ongoing dialogues with many stakeholders, including the general public, that 
articulate the values underlying their work and how they will be accountable.   
 
This report has suggested a framework for understanding civil society legitimacy and 
accountability, and used that framework to suggest ways that civil society organizations 
can construct accountability systems that strengthen their legitimacy and enhance their 
creation of public value at both the organization and domain levels.  We have drawn on a 
wide range of innovative initiatives that have enhanced civil society legitimacy and 
accountability in many countries and regions.   
 
e believe that it is imperative for civilW
questions about their legitimacy and accountability if they are to fulfill their potential for 
contribution to good governance and problem solving.  Recent experience suggests that 
civil society can hold powerful actors—national governments, private firms, 
intergovernmental organizations, and transnational corporations—to higher standards of 
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performance and accountability.  Indeed, that success is in part responsible for escalating 
challenges to civil society’s own legitimacy and accountability.  Civil society legitimacy 
and accountability initiatives can help connect their social goals with the resources and 
power of other sectors to accomplish otherwise impossible local, national and global 
results.  Enhanced civil society legitimacy and accountability can be the basis for new 
models of governance and problem solving that are desperately needed by a rapidly-
changing  and increasingly interdependent world.   
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